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I. INTRODUCTION
There is perhaps no greater tragedy in a parent's life than learning that one's
child is terminally ill. Today, more than at any time in the past, when conventional
treatment fails, dying children are given access to experimental treatment. To a
surprising extent, society takes for granted the participation of dying children in
medical experiments. In part, this is because we have come to view participation in
clinical trials as a potential benefit. This view contrasts sharply with the dominant
perception of the mid to late 20th century, which viewed medical research as a
potential threat to vulnerable populations. Upon closer scrutiny, both of these
perspectives carry with them some important truths. This Article seeks to build
upon those truths by undertaking a critical analysis of contemporary ethical and legal
policies governing the inclusion of terminally ill children in clinical research.
Well-documented abuses of human subjects in medical experimentation,
including research with children, created concern in the latter decades of the 20th
century. This led to the perception that children were vulnerable, given their
inability to protect their own interests, and that the mere fact that parents gave
informed consent was insufficient to safeguard their children from the potential
harms of medical experimentation. Federal regulations put into place in 1981 sought
to provide the necessary additional safeguards. Such rules might have led to a
relatively small percentage of sick children enrolling in clinical trials in pediatric
oncology. Yet today, a strikingly large majority of U.S. children with cancer are
enrolled in Phase III clinical trials and receive therapy under experimental
conditions. This is unlike the situation of adults with cancer, where approximately
t Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law, and member, Children's Memorial
Hopsital Institutional Review Board, Chicago, IL. Both authors are profoundly grateful to Amy
Young, DePaul Law, Class of 2004, for her spectacular assistance in preparing this Article for
publication.
Professor of Pediatrics and Professor of Medical Ethics and Humanities at the Feinberg
School of Medicine, Northwestern University and the Children's Memorial Hospital, Chicago, Illinois;
Interim Chief, Division of General Academic Pediatrics at Children's Memorial. Dr. Frader's clinical
interests focus on palliative and hospice care for children.
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fifteen percent participate in clinical trials. The overwhelming majority of children
with cancer become subjects in medical experiments.
These numbers might be unsurprising as pediatric cancer research involves
children suffering from life-threatening diseases, which until the 1960s had virtually
no effective therapy. In the mid-twentieth century, clinicians and families agreed
that clinical studies offered the best chance to save the lives of the affected children.
The partnership between pediatric cancer research and clinical studies proved
remarkably effective. In less than half a century, clinical research in pediatric
oncology produced great progress. The most common form of childhood leukemia
went from being a nearly always fatal disease to one cured more than seventy-five
percent of the time. Such success no doubt contributed to a willingness to permit
children to become the subjects of medical experiments, and perhaps reflected a
more general shift in American thinking about the nature of medical research.
Beginning in the mid-1980s, in response to scientific progress achieved through
clinical research in cancer and AIDS, Americans began to demand access to clinical
trials.
These factors help to explain the high percentage of children with cancer who
participate in clinical studies, and may also explain the limited ethical and legal
scrutiny this issue has received. It may seem needlessly academic to analyze the
pros and cons of enrolling pediatric cancer patients in clinical trials. Nonetheless, it
is far from clear that the sickest of children-those whom conventional treatment
cannot cure-personally benefit from enrollment in early-phase studies.
To the extent that we fail to explore the legal and ethical issues surrounding
children's participation in clinical studies, particularly in Phase I clinical trials, we
run the risk of replicating the historical abuses of this exploitable population.
Toward this end, this Article undertakes a critical analysis of the legal and ethical
norms governing the enrollment of sick children in early-phase trials. The Article
begins with a brief overview of the history of medical experimentation involving
children, assessing both its great promise and its inherent limitations. Part II
describes contemporary practices governing research with this population,
particularly in regard to Phase I studies. Part III then explores the key legal and
ethical problems with the manner in which Phase I pediatric trials are conducted.
Finally, the Article concludes by exposing, critiquing and refining the justifications
for and the ramifications of permitting and promoting children's access to Phase I
trials.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF MEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING CHILDREN
Since the dawn of modern public health medicine in the West, there has been a
remarkable transformation of childhood morbidity and mortality. In the past two
hundred years, infant and child mortality has plummeted. In just the last fifty years,
research has led to cures for many, if not most, of the common childhood illnesses
and many of the ravages of premature birth. Children with major chronic conditions,
such as cystic fibrosis, diabetes and sickle cell disease, used to die before reaching
the age of majority. Now many live well into adulthood. As a result, parents in
Western industrial or post-industrial societies now expect their children to survive
and thrive-even children with life-threatening disorders.
During this period, some "medical progress" has come with a high price:
undignified and harmful research practices involving children and others unable to
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protect themselves. Beecher documented several of these cases in a landmark paper
in 1966:1
" In an effort to learn about the functional anatomy of the urinary tract,
doctors inserted catheters into the bladders of healthy newborns, injected
radio-opaque dye and performed multiple X-ray studies.
" Physicians suspected liver injury might result from administration of an
antibiotic. Investigators administered the drug to "inmates of a children's
center," including "mental defectives or juvenile delinquents" without
any "disease other than acne." The researchers stopped the study early
because of "high incidences of significant hepatic dysfunction." Several
subjects subsequently required liver biopsies.2
Beginning in the 1970s, governments and professionals acted to prevent
research-related harms to those lacking adequate decision-making capacity. 3 In the
United States, decades-long practices of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
tended to exclude children from research aimed at establishing the safety and
efficacy of new medications. Regulations regarding human research subject
protection included special sections restricting the inclusion of minors in clinical
studies.
This regulatory process-and parallel concerns about prolonged liability that
might result from claims about research-related harms to children-had a double-
edged effect. The regulations required researchers to demonstrate that the benefits
of the proposed research outweighed the possible burdens to child subjects. As
such, the regulations called attention to the developmental vulnerability of children
who were potential research subjects. This caution may have helped to prevent
unnecessary, or simply foolish, harms to children from medical studies. On the
other hand, the bureaucratic hurdles and liability fears have no doubt slowed, or in
some cases, halted potentially valuable biomedical progress.
Concern over the latter possibility has led to federal policy changes in recent
years. Beginning in 1998, for example, Phase III clinical trials conducted with the
support of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) were required to include children
or provide a justification for their exclusion.4 The FDA also requires companies to
include children in their new drug approval process, using both incentives and
penalties to insure compliance. In addition to rejecting studies that unjustifiably
limit access to children, the FDA encouraged companies to conduct research
regarding the pediatric safety of already marketed drugs by providing a six-month
I H. K. Beecher, Ethics and Clinical Research, 274 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1354 (1966).
2 Id. at 1354-60.
3 Michael D. Lemonick & Andrew Goldstein, At Your Own Risk, TIME MAGAZINE, Apr. 22,
2002, at 46, available at 2002 WL 8386181.
The revelation of these and other scandals led to the National Research Act of 1974,
which required institutional review boards to approve and monitor all federally funded
research. The Department of Health and Human Services followed up by creating what
is now called the Office for Human Research Protection, whose job was supposed to be
to oversee the IRBs.
Id.
4 However, an oddity in the definition of "childhood" used by the NIH permits an end-run
around this objective. The NIH defines children as "individuals under the age of 21." NAT'L INST. OF
HEALTH, NIH Policy and Guidelines on the Inclusion of Children as Participants in Research
Involving Human Subjects (1998), at http://grants I .nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/not98-024.html.
Therefore, by allowing eighteen to twenty-one-year-old adults to count as children, one can meet the
NIH requirement of inclusion without performing physiologically meaningful studies to assess
children's vulnerability to medication at various stages prior to full adulthood.
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patent extension for drug manufacturers who submitted their applications to the FDA
on or before January 1, 2002.'
This policy shift in favor of including children in clinical studies occurred as
part of a broader movement wherein consumer groups demanded access to clinical
trials. By the mid-1980s, the absence of effective treatment, much less cures, for
AIDS led advocates to demand access to clinical trials arguing, "A Drug Trial is
Health Care Too." 6 This campaign helped to transform the public perception of
medical experimentation from a risky, exploitative venture into the best response to
an incurable disease. Then in the 1990s, advocates for women's health endorsed this
image of medical research by decrying the decades-long exclusion of women of
reproductive age from clinical research and the resulting ignorance about the safety
and efficacy of treatments when used by women.
Progress in the development of treatments for HIV and cancer, among other
conditions, has transformed society's perception of the nature of medical research,
making inclusion much more desirable than previously perceived. Nonetheless, the
same justifications for access to clinical trials may not apply with equal force to
those who have exhausted their options for established therapy, or Phase II and
Phase III studies, and have become eligible for Phase I studies. This is particularly
true for sick children.
There has long been considerable debate about the acceptability of children as
subjects of biomedical and behavioral research. At least as far back as the
publication of the Nuremberg Code on human experimentation, and the subsequent
first Declaration of Helsinki on that same topic, renowned ethicists have argued that
children must not be subjected to medical experimentation. The extended exchange
in the 1970s between Paul Ramsey 7 and Richard McCormick 8 highlights the ethical
issues. Children, at least prior to achieving some level of intellectual sophistication
and emotional maturity, cannot make autonomous decisions about whether or not to
enroll in studies. Ramsey, consistent with the Nuremberg Code, felt that the
inability to give consent precluded including children in medical research unless
participation held out a prospect of providing individual benefit. McCormick, in
contrast, maintained that such wholesale exclusion of children resulted in
disadvantaging the entire class of minors. Further, he argued, assuming tolerable, or
in his words "no realistic" risks, children ought to participate in research precisely
because such participation would benefit others.
The moral issues have changed little from the 1960s and '70s when these
debates occurred. They emerge with particular clarity when considering the
5 Congress passed the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act (FDAMA) in
November 1997, reforming the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938. 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2000).
Section III of the FDAMA contains the pediatric incentive provision. 21 U.S.C. § 355a (2000). Then,
in December of 1998, the FDA codified the Final Rule: Regulations Requiring Manufacturers to
Assess the Safety and Effectiveness of New Drugs and Biological Products on Pediatric Populations.
63 Fed. Reg. 66,632 (Dec. 2, 1998) (codified in 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 312, 314 & 601). But see Ass'n of
Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. FDA, 226 F. Supp. 2d 204, 222 (2002) (holding that the FDA
exceeded its authority in adopting a rule requiring drug manufacturers to conduct tests on the pediatric
population and to suggest pediatric doses for all drugs, even those intended exclusively for adult use).
6 George J. Annas, The Changing Landscape of Human Experimentation: Nuremburg,
Helinski, and Beyond, 2 HEALTH MATRIX 119, 132 (1992).
7 See PAUL RAMSEY, THE PATIENT AS PERSON: EXPLORATIONS IN MEDICAL ETHICS 1-58
(1970).
8 See, e.g., Richard McCormick, Proxy Consent in Experimental Situations, 18
PERSPECTIVES BIOLOGY & MED. 2 (1974).
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participation of children in Phase I clinical trials, which are intended to establish,
"toxicity, metabolism, absorption, elimination, and other pharmacological action
.... ,9 The design of a Phase I study generally involves placing participants on
escalating doses of a study drug and observing them to determine the maximum dose
at which the drug can safely be tolerated. To the extent that there is any therapeutic
benefit to participation in such a study, it is incidental, or indeed coincidental, to its
central purpose.
With respect to Phase I clinical trials in pediatrics, we need to establish the
extent to which it is ever appropriate for children to participate. What are the
benefits of participation and to whom? What are the risks associated with
enrollment in such studies? How can one make reasonable determinations about the
balance between benefits and risks for a given study or a given prospective enrollee?
The following section begins with a descriptive overview of contemporary pediatric
research practices in the Phase I context. Thereafter, it undertakes to answer these
questions via a critical analysis of the legal and ethical issues raised by current
policies governing the inclusion of children in clinical research.
III. DYING CHILDREN AND MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION: AN
OVERVIEW OF PHASE I RESEARCH WITH CHILDREN
Scientific progress in treating and curing pediatric ailments, whether in
oncology, HIV treatment, cardiology or any area of pediatric medicine, depends
upon conducting clinical trials as rigorous and thorough as those in adult medicine.
In order to safely introduce new treatment regimens for children, pediatricians must
conduct Phase I, II and III trials. Children differ physiologically from adults, so
without doing parallel studies, one would not know proper dosing for children, the
range of side effects new medications produce in children or whether the drugs work
as intended in children. If one relies only on the results of trials conducted in adults,
physicians risk substantial harm to children, either in the form of unrevealed toxicity
or false hopes that drugs will help children when, in fact, they may not help despite
benefits for adults. The antibiotic chloramphenicol, for example, proved life-saving
in many cases of bacterial infection in adults and older children when first
introduced, but when given to infants, the drug can rapidly produce fatal shock.'
Treatments for conditions that occur exclusively or much more commonly
among children than adults do not undergo clinical trials in adults. In such
circumstances, the only way to introduce new medications for use with children
involves trials in pediatrics. In each of these contexts, early-phase trials in which
investigators seek to discern evidence regarding such things as toxicity and
maximum tolerated dose, enrollment may not provide a meaningful prospect of
benefit to individual subjects. Conducting these studies is nonetheless necessary to
confer benefits on future patients.
As compelling as they may be, these societal reasons favoring the performance
of early phase clinical trials on pediatric subjects cannot be invoked as the sole
justification for subjecting children to medical experimentation. American society
9 George J. Annas, Questing for Grails: Duplicity, Betrayal and Self-Deception in
Postmodern Medical Research, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 297, 310 (1996) (citing
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL
AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, PROTECTING HUMAN SUBJECTS 65 (1981)).
10 Charles F. Weiss et al., Chloramphenicol in the Newborn Infant. A Physiologic Explanation
of Its Toxicity When Given in Excessive Doses, 262 NEw ENG. J. MED. 787, 787 (1960).
HeinOnline  -- 29 Am. J.L. & Med. 305 2003
306 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE VOL. 29 NO. 2&3 2003
values individualism and autonomy over communitarian or altruistic values. Thus, it
is not enough to say that because these studies will benefit other sick children in the
future, it is permissible to place these sick children at any level of risk. In order to
justify their inclusion, we must balance the risks inherent in participation in Phase I
research to individual children against whatever benefits might accrue.
Identifying subjects for Phase I research often has been a problematic and
controversial process. This is inherent in the design and function of Phase I
research, which is not focused on the goal of treating, let alone curing the
participant. Rather, the focus is on establishing the manner in which a given
substance or treatment affects the human body. Unlike later phase trials, which
focus on safety, efficacy and refining dose, Phase I trials hold out little hope of
benefiting the participant, save by pure coincidence. In the context of clinical
research with adults, sponsors and investigators often have used marginally ethical
means of enrolling participants in such trials."
The problem of identifying children for Phase I research is both more and less
challenging than that of identifying adults. Federal regulations greatly limit the
extent to which children may become subjects in non-therapeutic research (i.e., any
experiment that holds out no possibility of benefit to the individual). Consequently,
in virtually all cases, pediatric Phase I studies are performed on children who are
sick and might conceivably benefit from the study. A Phase I pediatric study, for
example, may involve a substance that, because it works for some adults, is thought
to have promise for children as well. Phase I studies in pediatrics most commonly
involve children who have not responded to conventional treatment. The practical
reality is that children in Phase I studies tend to be very, very ill.
Assessing the risks and benefits of participation in Phase I clinical trials is
complicated. Theoretically, it should be easy to measure benefit in studying the
outcomes of Phase I clinical trials. A benefit would be construed as the achievement
of a cure, remission or amelioration of symptoms.' 2 In one of the only studies on
this topic, researchers reviewed the overall response rates of 577 children with
pediatric cancer who were enrolled in Phase I studies in the 1970s and '80s. 1' The
researchers noted a 5.9% response rate, meaning that thirty-four of the children
achieved a complete or a partial remission of their disease. The majority of these
remissions were partial, however, and the median duration of the eleven "full
remissions" was only sixty days. Thus, as Professor Terrence Ackerman notes in his
1995 critical review of Phase I pediatric oncology studies, over 98% of participants
got no benefit at all. Fewer than 2% of participants achieved what is termed a
"complete remission," which lasted only for an average of two months, afterwhich
the disease returned.
14
11 See JESSICA MITFORD, KIND AND USUAL PUNISHMENT: THE PRISON BUSINESS 138-68
(1973) (describing the use of incarcerated prisoners as subjects in Phase I trials).
12 To be sure, there may be psychic benefits gained by one who elects to undergo medical
experimentation for altruistic reasons. These benefits are hard to measure, even when evaluating adult
volunteers. The extent of their relevance in pediatric studies, particularly in those involving the
youngest participants, is questionable. See infra Part IV for a discussion of evidence indicating that
the desire for personal benefit, rather than altruism, is the central motivation behind adult
participation in clinical studies.
13 W.L. Furman et al., Mortality in Pediatric Phase I Clinical Trials, 81 J. Nat. Cancer Inst.
1193, 1193-94 (1989).
14 Terrence F. Ackerman, The Ethics of Phase I Pediatric Oncology Trials, 17 IRB 1, 2
(1995).
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Recent data echo these findings. In a review of Phase I cancer studies at a major
research center, the authors noted an overall "response rate" of 3%.5 Onepercent of
the subjects died as a result of toxic effects of the experimental agents., A 1998
review article stated that, "5-7.5% of children who enter Phase I trials achieve either
a partial or complete response," meaning regression or disappearance of measurable
tumor. 17 The paper also notes that many children enrolled on Phase I studies have
experienced "heavy pretreatment" as part of earlier efforts to bring about a cure. As
a result, they may have less tolerance for toxic agents than would healthier children.
This makes it harder for researchers to ensure the accuracy of their findings. It also
may make the Phase I study riskier, and less likely to yield benefit, to the sick
participant. Finally, another review of Phase I pediatric cancer trials conducted
between 1978 and 1996 reported an "overall objective response rate" of 7.9%. The
range of tumor response spanned less than 3% of subjects in a trial to as many as
17.7%, depending on the type of cancer and agent used. Only 0.7% of the enrolled
subjects were thought to have died as a direct result of drug toxicity. 8
There may be a trend towards a higher rate of tumor response in more recent
trials. Nonetheless, it is important to bear in mind the limited nature of what is
meant by "response rate." Specifically, a finding of a "response" to a study drug
does not imply that the participants' conditions went into full remission, let alone
that they were cured. Indeed, a response may mean nothing more than that the size
of their cancer was reduced to some degree.' 9 This reveals little about the extent to
which the treatment lengthened lives, improved symptoms or contributed to overall
patient/subject well-being. Furthermore, the assessment of the individual benefits
and risks of participation has suffered because of the questions that go unasked
about the quality of life for children enrolled in these Phase I studies. Did the
clinical trial enhance or impede the individual's dying process? Did enrollment in a
clinical trial limit eligibility for or receipt of palliative and hospice care?
Outside of the Phase I context, some evidence suggests that enrollment in
clinical trials, in and of itself, produces better outcomes. Phase III studies evaluate
medical interventions that have shown promise and established safety. Phase III
studies generally use a relatively large number of participants and aim to determine
efficacy under optimal clinical circumstances. Evaluations of a series of Phase III
pediatric oncology and neonatal intensive care studies suggest that children enrolled
in therapeutic trials have better outcomes than those receiving similar treatment
outside of the research context. 20  A recent report from Switzerland echoes this
finding.
21
15 The paper does not note the ages of the participants studies analyzed, but instead infers that
they are adults or that the majority of participants are near adulthood. T.L. Smith et al., Design and
Results of Phase 1 Cancer Clinical Trials: Three-year Experience at MD. Anderson Cancer Center,
14 J. Clinical Oncology 287, 293 (1996).
16 Id.
17 M. Smith et al., Conduct of Phase I Trials in Children with Cancer, 16 J. Clinical Oncology
966, 967 (1998).
18 S. Shah et al., Phase I Therapy Trials in Children with Cancer, 20 J. Pediatric
Hematology/Oncology 431, 431 (1998).
19 Ackerman, supra note 14, at 2.
20 See, e.g., E.L. Lennox et al., Nephroblastoma: Treatment During 1970-3 and the Effect of
Inclusion in the First MRC Trial, 2(6190) Brit. Med. J. 567 (1979) (discussing the results of an early
pediatric cancer trial).
21 H.P. Wagner et al., Childhood NHL in Switzerland: Incidence and Survival of 120 Study
and 42 Non-Study Patients, 24 Med. & Pediatric Oncology 281 (1995). For articles lending additional
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The fact that study participants have better outcomes than those receiving
treatment in the absence of a study is not entirely new or surprising. It seems that, at
least with regard to Phase III controlled studies, there may be clinical benefits to
being a research subject. Even if there is a beneficial effect associated with
participating in Phase III clinical studies, there is little reason to assume that the
same benefits would extend to participants in Phase I trials. Indeed, given the
divergent aims of Phase I trials, such an assumption may be completely unfounded.
Nonetheless, evidence of a positive value associated with Phase III study
participation, coupled with the admirable determination of academic pediatricians to
improve the outlook for their patients with life-threatening diseases, likely have
contributed to the success in enrolling terminally ill children in Phase I clinical
trials, in spite of the overwhelming odds against providing them with any
meaningful relief
IV. LEGAL AND ETHICAL COMPLEXITIES RAISED BY PHASE I TRIALS IN
CHILDREN
Many of the problems Phase I research raises in children mirror those inherent
in Phase I trials with adults: the misconception that such research represents
"treatment," and the potential for researchers to lose sight of their patient's best
interests as they simultaneously pursue roles as treating physicians and clinical
investigators. When considering Phase I research in children, the unique nature of
the relationships among parents, ailing children and physician-researchers
complicates these problems considerably. In order to explore the problematic
features inherent in Phase I research in children, this section begins with a
discussion of the "therapeutic misconception." The section then describes the
challenges Phase I studies pose to the fiduciary nature of the doctor-patient
relationship. Finally, the section closes with an analysis of the legal and ethical
problems inherent in parental or proxy consent.
A. THERAPEUTIC MISCONCEPTION
Phase I studies are explicitly non-therapeutic in nature. Intended to reveal the
pharmacological action of the study agent, the Phase I trial seeks to establish a
baseline regarding toxicity before moving into the Phase II studies of safety and
biological effects of the intervention. Many have noted the tendency of individuals
involved in these trials to mistakenly perceive them as "therapeutic" or "potentially
therapeutic." 22 This phenomenon, known as the "therapeutic misconception," seems
to be an understandable response of patients and family members when conventional
therapies have failed to produce a cure. Physicians approach family members with
the news that no established treatments offer the potential for meaningful benefits,
and the family then hears that a research trial exists in which they might participate.
Patients, parents and older children may naturally view such research as their best
support to these findings, see S.B. Murphy, The National Impact of Clinical Cooperative Group Trials
for Pediatric Cancer, 24 Med. & Pediatric Oncology 279 (1995) and S. Schmidt et al., Do Sick
Newborn Infants Benefit from Participation in a Randomized Clinical Trial?, 134 J. Pediatrics 151
(1999).
22 Paul S. Appelbaum, The Therapeutic Misconception: Informed Consent in Psychiatric
Research, 5 Int'l J.L. & Psychiatry 319, 321 (1982).
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chance at survival. One survey of clinical researchers found that 94% agreed that
adult patients enroll in Phase I studies "mostly for the possible medical benefit.,
23
These studies help give lie to the notion that patients volunteer for Phase I trials
out of an altruistic desire to help others who may contract the same illness in the
future, even when study personnel explicitly tell prospective study participants that
the aim of the trial involves accumulation of knowledge for future patients. Patients
and parents most likely volunteer because they nevertheless believe that they,
personally, may benefit.
The confusion over the extent to which Phase I studies constitute "treatment"
rather than non-therapeutic experimentation results from more than the sick patient's
desperation to find a cure. The therapeutic misconception is fostered in part by
those who purport to set standards for governing human research. The 1964
Declaration of Helsinki, for instance, sets guidelines for doctors in clinical research
by classifying all research on humans into two categories: therapeutic and non-
therapeutic. 24 The Declaration terms some research "therapeutic" and blurs the line
between research, the goal of which is the advancement of science, and treatment,
the goal of which is to assist, if not to cure, an ailing patient. The National Cancer
Institute goes further, calling Phase I studies (which would be "non-therapeutic"
under the Helsinki Declaration) "potentially therapeutic. 25
Perhaps the largest source of confusion regarding Phase I trials as "treatment"
comes out of the process by which patients consent to participate in these trials.
Professor Nancy King has pioneered several studies documenting the decidedly
strategic use of language in consent forms for clinical trials. Working with co-
author Gail E. Henderson, King has conducted research into the presentation of
information in the relatively new field of gene transfer research and has found that
consent forms frequently use language that connotes treatment rather than research. 6
They reviewed consent forms from all gene transfer studies initiated between 1990
and 2000, and found that even though over half of the trials were Phase I, only 1%
of consent forms stated unambiguously, "You will not benefit [from
participation]. 27  The tendency of consent forms to obscure the purposes of the
proposed research and to exaggerate the potential benefits to participants make it no
wonder that patients for whom conventional treatment has failed tend to mistake
Phase I toxicity trials of new agents for "potential cures."
Consent forms aside, patients and families likely make trial participation
decisions based, at least in part, on interactions they have with their treating
physicians. Daugherty, an oncologist and ethics researcher, has documented that
many oncologists share the therapeutic misconception. In spite of numerous studies
showing that fewer than 10% of patients can expect even the most modest of
23 Eric Kodish et al., Ethical Issues in Phase I Oncology Research: A Comparison of
Investigators and Institutional Review Board Chairpersons, 10 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 1810, 1812
(1992).
24 Declaration of Helsinki (1964), 313 BRIT. MED. J. 1448, 1448-49 (1996).
25 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. & BIOMEDICAL &
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, PROTECTING HUMAN SUBJECTS 65 (1982) (quoting Letter from Edward N.
Brandt, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Health, HHS, to Honorable Henry A. Waxman, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Health and the Environment (Nov. 20, 1981)).
26 Many Gene Research Consent Forms Misleading: Study, at http://www.laurushealth.com
/HealthNews/reuters/NewsStoryl 101200227.html (Nov. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Consent Forms]; Gail E.
Henderson & Nancy M.P. King, Perceived Benefits of Participation in Gene Transfer Research, 7
HemAware 73 (2002).
27 Consent Forms, supra note 26.
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benefits from a Phase I trial, 18% of surveyed oncologists expected that subjects
enrolled in Phase I trials would experience an "overall benefit," while 15% felt
subjects would have a tumor response to the Phase I agent(s). One has to wonder
how such beliefs might, subconsciously or otherwise, affect communications with
patients and influence trial participation.
28
Pediatricians share these therapeutic misconceptions, and studies show that
pediatric oncologists view enrollment of children as offering a benefit to individual
subjects, despite trial designs dedicated to revealing "dose-limiting toxicity." In a
peer-reviewed article on clinical trials in children with cancer, Smith and colleagues
assert "children are given drugs on Phase I studies with therapeutic intent. '29 An
NIH-based group discussing pediatric oncologists' views on end-of-life noted that in
response to a vignette describing a child virtually certain to die of recurrent cancer,
"20.1% of pediatric oncologists recommended active therapy" which included
12.3% recommending a Phase I trial.3 ° In contrast, an Italian research group writing
about studies in HIV-infected women and children stated, "Phase I trails are non-
clinical biomedical research that must be carried out on low-risk subjects."'"
The problem with therapeutic misconception is not that patients and loved ones
experience feelings of hopefulness when offered the chance to participate in Phase I
research. Certainly, there is nothing wrong with the fact that some patients may find
psychological or spiritual benefits in doing "everything possible" to fight off their
disease. The problem lies in the extent to which study personnel respond to the
tendency of patients to mistake Phase I trials for medical treatment. Recall that most
patients who consent to participate in Phase I research do so not for the "psychic"
benefit, but because they mistakenly believe they will experience an actual benefit.
32
The problem of therapeutic misconception therefore devolves into an issue of
fiduciary duty: how far must a doctor or researcher go to ascertain the reasons
behind a patient's or surrogate's willingness to participate in a Phase I trial?
B. FIDUCIARY DUTY AND THE DUELING ROLES OF DOCTOR AND RESEARCHER
For several decades, federal and state courts alike have acknowledged the
fiduciary nature of the physician-patient relationship. 33 In a fiduciary relationship,
one party depends upon the other, trusting the other to act in his or her best interests.
These relationships exist when the dependent or more vulnerable party delegates
power to the fiduciary so that the fiduciary may act on her behalf Professor Marc
A. Rodwin describes the manner in which doctor-patient relationships resemble
"classic fiduciary relationships":
28 C. Daugherty et al., Perceptions of Cancer Patients and Their Physicians Involved in Phase
I Trials, 13 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 1062, 1065 (1995).
29 M. Smith et al., Conduct of Phase I Trials in Children with Cancer, 16 J. CLINICAL
ONCOLOGY 966, 967 (1998).
30 J.M. Hilden et al., Attitudes and Practices Among Pediatric Oncologists Regarding End-of-
Life Care: Results of the 1998 American Society of Clinical Oncology Survey, 19 J. CLINICAL
ONCOLOGY 205, 208 (2001).
31 M. de Martino et al., Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type I Infection, Clinical Trials, and
Ethics in Pediatrics, 421 ACTA PAEDIATRICA 78, 82 (1997 Supp.).
32 See Daugherty, supra note 28.
33 Marc A. Rodwin, Strains in the Fiduciary Metaphor: Divided Physician Loyalties and
Obligations in a Changing Health Care System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 241, 241-42 (1995) (noting that
"[t]he idea that physicians are or should be fiduciaries for their patients ... is a dominant metaphor in
medical ethics and law today").
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Physicians have specialized knowledge and expertise. They also
control the use of medical resources needed by patients: only they can
admit patients to hospitals, order diagnostic tests, and prescribe drugs.
Patients are often ill or anxious about their health, which increases
their dependence. The patient-physician relationship presupposes
patients entrusting physicians to act on their behalf and physicians
remaining loyal to their patients.
34
Central to the notion of fiduciary duty is the recognition of the potential for the
fiduciary to experience divided or conflicting loyalties. Fiduciary law seeks to
resolve these conflicts by mandating priorities for the fiduciary in the event of a
conflict. The current structure of the U.S. healthcare system generates a host of
fiduciary challenges for physicians, virtually all of which relate to forces that
compete with doctors' obligations to their patients. In the managed care setting,
conflicts arise when physicians must act as gatekeepers, minimizing patients' access
to expensive tests or contacts with medical sub-specialists. More dramatic conflicts
exist in "gag clause" contracts, which prohibit physicians from advising patients
about alternative courses of action not offered under the patient's insurance package.
Additional fiduciary challenges arise in the area of confidentiality, when a physician
may have a moral, or even a legal, duty to inform a third party about her patient's
private medical condition. Finally, one finds fiduciary conflicts in obstetrical
medicine, when doctors threaten to undermine their pregnant patients' autonomy
rights by imposing a particular course of action upon them in the name of protecting
their fetuses.35
Fiduciary conflicts in the clinical research setting grow out of doctors' divided
loyalties when they attempt to function both as physician and as researcher. This
conflict can exist at several levels. The treating physician also may have a role as
developer of an institutionally approved study directly relevant to the patient's
condition. As the originator of the research, the physician-investigator has a
scientific interest in seeing her idea tested. She also may have understandable
enthusiasm for and a not-so-objective bias in favor of the experimental intervention.
Such principal investigators might have difficulty maintaining neutrality when
communicating the availability of the trial to patients and family members. More
commonly in academic centers conducting controlled trials, treating physicians have
roles as "co-investigators," in which they expect to "offer" open research protocols
to patients meeting study criteria. In such settings, institutional pressures favor
patient enrollment. Centers have to enter minimum numbers of subjects into trials in
order to maintain their status as members of the cooperative group. Payments to
support the clinical research enterprise at a center often depend on the absolute
number or percentage of eligible patients enrolled as subjects. An individual's
academic advancement (e.g., promotion in the professorial ranks) may depend on
how quickly studies fill, and on how soon and how often the physician-researcher
34 Id. at 245-46.
35 See Michelle Oberman, Mothers and Doctors' Orders: Unmasking the Doctor's Fiduciary
Role in Maternal-Fetal Conflicts, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 451 (2000) (demonstrating the manner in which
what are commonly-termed "maternal-fetal conflicts" are in fact cases of breach of the obstetrician's
fiduciary duty); see also Mary Faith Marshall, Commentary: Mal-intentioned Illiteracy, Willful
Ignorance, and Fetal Protection Laws: Is There a Lexicologist in the House?, 27 J. L. MED. & ETHICS
343 (1999); L.J. Nelson & Mary Faith Marshall, Ethical and Legal Analysis of Three Coercive
Policies Aimed at Substance Abuse by Pregnant Women, in ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUNDATION,
SUBSTANCE ABUSE POLICY RESEARCH PROGRAM (1997).
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publishes papers discussing research results. Many environmental pressures favor
enrolling patients in trials, and being the treating physician and researcher or
researcher's colleague may confuse the individual's responsibilities.
This blurring of roles can pose problems because unlike the "pure" physician,
whose primarily obligation involves safeguarding her patient's health, the researcher
has additional goals stemming from an interest in promoting the accumulation of
scientific knowledge, supporting one's program or institution, career advancement,
or in some cases, direct financial gain. Recently, these factors came to bear in the
context of one particularly notorious pediatric Phase I trial. The trial involved gene
transfer experiments regarding ornitine transcarbamylase (OTC) deficiency at the
University of Pennsylvania. This Phase I study received critical national attention
after one subject, Jesse Gelsinger, died. Subsequent investigations revealed that
there were apparent, if not actual, financial conflicts of interest for the investigators
because both the principal investigator and the University had substantial equity
interests in the company developing the viral vector used to deliver a normal gene
into subjects' livers. According to the FDA's final assessment of the case, Gelsinger
underwent the intervention despite considerable information that the experiment
should not go forward.36
Patients may find it difficult to recognize when their doctor has switched hats
and is acting primarily as an investigator rather than as a treating physician focused
exclusively on patient benefit. Patients with chronic, terminal illnesses often
develop close, trusting relationships with their physicians over the course of months,
or even years. These individuals and families, having exhausted conventional
treatment options, may have difficulty knowing how to respond when the doctor-
cum-Phase I-researcher approaches them about an open study concerning the
condition.37
Researchers generally are not motivated by selfish goals. They believe clinical
investigations constitute the only valid mechanism for advancing toward a cure for
the patient's illness, even if the study at hand has little likelihood of helping the
individual patient. Nonetheless, when the terminally ill patient's doctor offers
participation in a Phase I trial, patients and family members tend to hear a
recommendation to enroll. As a result, Professor Annas argues that physicians
should not be permitted to play both roles:
It is unlikely that it will ever be possible ... for patients not to indulge
in self-deception by imagining that research is really treatment and that
they are patients, not research subjects. We cannot separate the subject
into two persons. But we can assure that the subject-patient always has
36 Letter from Steven Masiello, Director, Office of Compliance and Biologics Quality Center
for Biologics Evaluation and Research, FDA, to James M. Wilson, Institute for Human Gene Therapy
(Nov. 30, 2000), at http://www.fda.gov/foi/nidpoe/nl2l.pdf. Gelsinger suffered from a mild form of a
rare metabolic disorder, manageable through diet and drug regimens, but enrolled in a clinical trial of
a gene therapy study through the University of Pennsylvania; within three days, Gelsinger suffered
respiratory disease, liver and kidney failure, then died. Michael Baram, Making Clinical Trials Safer
for Human Subjects, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 253, 256 (2001); Sheryl Gay Stohlberg, The Biotech Death
of Jesse Gelsinger, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1999, § 6, at 137; A. Caplan et al., With the Best of
Intentions: Ethical Lessons from Adverse Events in Human Experimentation, Am. Soc'y for Bioethics
& Humanities Annual Meeting Plenary Session, Nashville, Tenn. (Oct. 26, 2001).
37 As Professor Annas notes, "When physician and researcher are merged into one person, it is
unlikely that patients can ever draw the distinction between these two conflicting roles because most
patients simply do not believe that their physician would knowingly harm them or would knowingly
use them as a means for their own end." Annas, supra note 9, at 311-12.
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a physician whose only obligation is to look out for the best interests
of the patient. Thus, we can (and should) prohibit physicians from
performing more than minimal risk research on their patients, and as a
corollary, only permit physician-researchers to recruit the patients of
other physicians for their research protocols. In this way, at least the
"doubling" of physician and researcher can be physically (and perhaps
psychologically) eliminated.38
The law could, and perhaps should, go farther in regulating these conflicts of
interest. The law of fiduciary obligations should address the potential for abuse of
power inherent in the physician/researcher confusion by invoking legal mechanisms
to promote fiduciary accountability. Others have noted the limitations on plaintiffs
who seek to sue their physicians for breach of fiduciary duty.39 The restrictions
derive largely from the law's conflation of medical negligence and fiduciary duty as
legal causes of action. This leads judges to reject cases in which the plaintiff has not
been harmed as a result of the doctor's malpractice. Recent cases, however, have
witnessed an expansion in the law's understanding of the physician's role as a
fiduciary.40 As a result, mechanisms to reign in the abuse of fiduciary power in non-
medical settings should become available in the clinical research context. These
methods include reducing the fiduciary's discretion by regulating their range of
permissible activities, supervising the fiduciary and penalizing those fiduciaries that
breach their client's trust.4' All three of these tactics could be applied to those who
overstep fiduciary bounds in clinical research.
What we know about the clinical benefits of Phase I trials, and about patients'
tendencies to misconstrue the nature of these trials, indicates that obtaining consent
to Phase I trials is fraught with the potential for breaching fiduciary duty. The
physician may breach her fiduciary duty whenever she secures her patient's
agreement to enter a Phase I trial without having assured that the patient understands
the low likelihood of therapeutic benefit and the physician's role as researcher.
In the context of Phase I pediatric clinical trials, the problem of phsysicans'
divided loyalties is far more than a theoretical threat to patient autonomy. Instead, it
operates in the context of parental grief and desperation, often fueled by the problem
of therapeutic misconception, to create a powerful impetus toward enrolling dying
children into non-therapeutic research studies.
38 Id. at 322.
39 Oberman, supra note 35, at 458-59 (citing Rodwin, supra note 33, at 247-48).
40 For example, the California Supreme Court held that a plaintiff's complaint stated a cause
of action for breach of fiduciary duty where a surgeon failed to disclose his research and financial
interests when obtaining the patient's informed consent for the procedures. Moore v. Regents of Univ.
of Cal., 739 P.2d 479, 485 (Cal. 1990). Applying Minnesota law, the Eighth Circuit went further and
commented that even when not recommending courses of treatment, physicians have fiduciary duties
to disclose conflicting loyalties. Shea v. Esensten, 208 F.3d 712, 717 (8th Cir. 2000). The court
recognized a financial interest in an HMO contract designed to minimize referrals as a conflicting
loyalty. See id at 717. But see Neade v. Portes, 739 N.E.2d 496, 498 (111. 2000) (refusing to impose a
duty on physicians to disclose HMO financial incentives for reducing referrals for outside testing and
specialists).
41 Rodwin, supra note 33, at 247.
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C. PARENTS AND PROXY CONSENT: THE CONFLUENCE OF THERAPEUTIC
MISCONCEPTION, BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AND PARENTAL GRIEF
In pediatric clinical trials, one easily can discern how the problems of
therapeutic misconception, coupled with the doctor's divided loyalties, intensify.
The inherently challenging process of identifying and honoring patients'
autonomous choices regarding participation in research is greatly complicated when
the patient is a minor. For theoretical and practical reasons, the fact that the study
participant is a minor complicates valid authorization of enrollment in fairly obvious
ways. The law generally does not permit minors to consent to their own healthcare,
much less to authorize research enrollment; therefore, the minor's guardian,
typically the parent(s), must decide whether to permit the child to enter a trial.42
The notion of informed consent grows out of the core ethical value of autonomy.
The mere presence of a third party decision-maker poses a threat to the child's
autonomy rights. When faced with the necessity of medical decision-making for
incompetent adults, the medical and legal systems attempt to preserve respect for
patient autonomy by requiring the surrogate to make a decision using "substituted
judgment." This involves instructing the surrogate decision-maker to infer what the
incompetent person would decide were he or she able to do SO.4
3
This cautionary guidance does not readily apply to parental decision-making for
children. Under ordinary circumstances, society expects parents to reflect upon the
medical information they have been given and decide about the child's treatment
based on a "best interests" standard. In the research context, the Belmont Report,
and much of the bioethics literature, refers to "parental permission," omitting
altogether the more legally charged term "consent. 4 4  Regardless of the
terminology, this legal structure permits doctors and investigators to treat or study
children without having to first ascertain whether the child either desires the
intervention or considers it in his or her best interest. Federal research regulations
acknowledge the problem and have attempted to address it by, at least in some
circumstances, requiring the minor's "assent" in addition to parental consent to
research. As Professor Jennifer Rosato has persuasively argued, however, the
concept of "assent" lacks legal force, does nothing to protect the interests of those
42 In addition, the state plays a role in medical decision-making for minors, limiting parental
authority over children through the doctrine of parens patriae. This doctrine provides that the state
limits parental authority to the power to act in a child's best interest. To the extent that the state
perceives a parent's action as inconsistent with a child's best interest, the state will intervene to order
proper medical care. Although there is a line of cases where the state has ordered medical treatment
that was refused by a parent, none of these cases involve experimental care. This may be because
courts acknowledge that while states "may not permit a parent to deny a child all treatment for a
condition which threatens his life," it is not for them to determine the most "effective" treatment
"when the parents have chosen between reasonable alternatives." Crouse Irving Mem. Hosp. v.
Paddock, 485 N.Y.S.2d 443, 444-45 (1985) (upholding order for blood transfusions, despite religious
objections, for both mother and baby during a Cesarean section delivery, citing In re Matter of
Hofbauer, 419 N.Y.S.2d 936 (1979)).
43 See Mark G. Kuczewski, Commentary: Narrative Views of Personal Identity and
Substituted Judgment in Surrogate Decision Making, 27 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 32 (1999).
44 NAT'L COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, & WELFARE, THE BELMONT REPORT (1979), available at http://ohrp.osophs
.dhhs.gov/humansubjects/guidance/Belmont.htm; see also W.G. Bartholome, Parents, Children, and
the Moral Benefits of Research, 6 HASTINGS CTR. REPORT 44, 44-45 (1976); Comm. on Bioethics,
Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Informed Consent, Parental Permission, and Assent in Pediatric Practice, 95
PEDIATRICS 314, 314-17 (1995).
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deemed too young to assent and does little to ensure a right to refuse for those teens
who do not wish to become research subjects.45
The absence of a substituted judgment model for parental decision-making
suggests that we view the parent-child relationship as unique and regard children and
their parents, in some sense, as a single unit. The law solidly supports this notion,
assuming that parents will act in their child's best interests.46 Everything we know
about therapeutic misconception, fiduciary conflicts and the grief of parents whose
child is dying should lead us to question the extent to which, in the context of Phase
I trials, we can reasonably ask parents of dying children to act purely in the child's
best interests.
Others have described the range of emotions that accompany a parent's response
to the end stages of a child's terminal illness. A parent may retain unrealistic hope
for improvement in the face of worsening illness.47  A parent may consent to
research in an effort to obtain a sense of control over the dying process. Having
worked with a particular, physician or team of physicians over the course of the
child's illness, parents may accept Phase I research because they fear losing both
their own and their child's relationships with the healthcare providers who have
worked so hard to save their child's life.48
We should not fault parents motivated by any of these reasons when authorizing
a child's participation in Phase I research. To a large extent, they seem to represent
the normal responses of loving parents to the tragic circumstances of a child's
terminal illness. Still, these reasons differ markedly from those ideally motivating
the enrolling of a terminally ill patient in a Phase I clinical research project.
Present practices governing Phase I pediatric trials ignore the ethical dilemma
inherent in the assumption that parents objectively can assess the "best interests" of
their dying child. Recall that parents enrolling their children in Phase I trials are
vulnerable to mistaken beliefs that such research will be not only therapeutic but
curative, and that their child's doctor, in recommending participation, is acting
purely on behalf of the child's interests. Researchers generally take parental
"consent" at face value. They assume that parents make fully informed, carefully
considered decisions when permitting their child to participate in such research, and
see it is as unnecessary, and perhaps intrusive and inappropriate, to take substantive
measures to ensure the "quality" of parental decision-making.
The fact remains that the odds do not favor a child's receiving any therapeutic
benefit from participating in a Phase I study. There is a substantial risk that
participation may cause discomfort, interfere with palliative care or occasionally
hasten death. As such, the fact that those responsible do little to ascertain parental
understanding and motivation when enrolling their child in a Phase I trial may be
viewed as a reflection of a systemic bias in favor of enrolling the child in the
45 See Jennifer Rosato, The Ethics of Clinical Trials: A Child's View, 28 J. L. MED. & ETHICS
362, 367-70 (2000).
46 This presumption is not without its shortcomings. See generally JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL.,
BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (2d ed. 1979) (focusing on the area of child placement
and the impact of parental decision-making on the child's psychological development). For a
fascinating critique of the legal system's failure to recognize children's rights, see Jane Rutherford,
One Child, One Vote: Proxies for Parents, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1463, 1525 (1998) (suggesting a model
in which parents can represent their children's political views).
47 Ackerman, supra note 14, at 4.
48 Ackerman, supra note 14, at 4 (citing S.C. Harth et al., The Psychological Profile of
Parents Who Volunteer Their Children for Clinical Research: A Controlled Study, 18 J. MED. ETHICS
86 (1992)).
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research, as opposed to considering each child's actual, complex interests at the end
of life. The current system encourages parents to consent in accord with
researchers' views that progress depends on conducting early phase research.
Clinical investigators live with a terrible and irreducible tension. They have a
fiduciary duty to pursue the patient's best interest and a communitarian duty to
obtain the knowledge necessary to advance the care of future patients.
V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS TOWARD PROMOTING SAFE AND
ETHICAL PRACTICES IN PEDIATRIC CLINICAL TRIALS
This tension challenges not only physicians, but also all those concerned with
protecting the best interests of children. Some commentators attempt to resolve the
inherent tension by suggesting that participating in research teaches children to value
contributions to their community and therefore it constitutes part of their moral
education.4 9  Society wants children to become altruistic, but it requires little
reflection to see that such a justification does not readily apply to early phase
clinical research with children in terminal stages of their diseases. Others offer
family-centered justifications for children to become Phase I subjects. These
suggest that parents have the legal authority to make all decisions regarding their
child's healthcare, and were society to limit the access of children to clinical trials,
this would strip both children and parents of this right. This approach assumes that
any decision-making regarding enrollment in pediatric clinical research reflects a
careful assessment of the child's best interest. A close scrutiny of the nature and
purpose of Phase I studies reveals such an assumption to be dubious, at best. It
succeeds only to the extent that (1) burdens to the child do not exceed some
difficult-to-define threshold, and (2) Phase I trials actually represent therapy, not
some illusion of treatment. Recognizing how untenable these individual-based
claims are, some might move beyond the individual's best interest and articulate a
family-centered justification that suggests that parents and other loved ones who
survive the child have an interest in knowing that they pursued any and all available
means to prolong life.
50
Both of these justifications attempt to locate benefit in the individual or family
unit in order to avoid the problem of endorsing consequentialist reasons for enrolling
children in Phase I studies. The legal and ethical obligation to safeguard the
individual's best interest is undermined if the principle justification for permitting
children to enroll in Phase I studies is that medical progress is a benefit to the
community. In view of legal and ethical obligations, justification for conducting
Phase I pediatric trials for the benefit of future children (i.e., accepting the
consequentialist reasons to enroll children in Phase I studies) exists only if the
individual, or at least the familial, reasons favoring inclusion are equally compelling.
Such trials are ethically permissible only to the extent that there remains an
unwavering commitment to protecting any given child's well-being during the dying
process.
49 For a discussion of this debate, see Terrence F. Ackerman, Fooling Ourselves with Child
Autonomy and Assent in Nontherapeutic Clinical Research, 27 CLINICAL RESEARCH 345, 345-48
(1979).
50 See Lainie F. Ross, Children as Research Subjects: A Proposal to Revise the Current
Federal Regulations Using a Moral Framework, 8 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 159, 169 (1997); Lainie F.
Ross, Health Care Decision Making by Children: Is It in Their Best Interest?, 27 HASTINGS CTR.
REPORT Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 44.
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Research on the consent process may provide avenues for substantially
improving parental understanding of the particular benefits, risks and alternatives to
participation in a given clinical trial. Truly informed consent to participate in a
Phase I research study must ensure that the participant or her guardian(s) manifest a
thorough understanding of (1) the risks and benefits inherent in the research, (2) the
fact that the trial does not properly constitute treatment and (3) the fact that
participation is unlikely to extend survival. Parents must be informed about the
extent to which participation in any given study may cause additional pain or
emotional distress as a result of the interventions, including discomfort associated
with not-otherwise-indicated diagnostic procedures. Finally, parents must be told of
the possibility that the experiment may hasten their child's death or have a negative
effect on possible palliative/hospice care alternatives. Failure to ensure that parents
fully understand these matters constitutes a breach of the physician's fiduciary duty
to the patient.
Strategies for ensuring this commitment to the child's welfare might include
video or computer-assisted educational materials. Another strategy might be
mandatory waiting periods between the first approach about a study and final
authorization. This might provide better opportunities to review consent documents
and consult with trusted advisors. Additionally, there could be required use of
human subject "consent advocates."
Ultimately, it may be impossible to articulate a rational justification consistent
with our ethical commitment to safeguarding the individual's best interest in favor of
Phase I research in children. In a sense, these trials represent a societal death ritual:
this is the way in which our society presently permits parents to grieve the horror of
grave illness and premature death in children. This is also the way our society
engages in a collective struggle against the scourge of terminal childhood illnesses.
Law and tradition in medical ethics insist on the paramount value of the individual
child's best interests in medical decisions regarding minors. It may be that we have
to accept that participation in Phase I studies embodies our hopes-no matter how
unrealistic-and our fears of the premature death of our children and simply
outweighs our rationality. While that may be so, if we are to escape the reviled
tendency of past generations to willingly exploit vulnerable populations in the name
of "scientific progress," these studies must go forward with a keen awareness of the
powerful duty owed to children by healthcare professionals, parents and the state:
"to comfort always."
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